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	Cricket has evolved over the last 30 years to offer three distinct products at the international level: Test Match cricket, played over five days (six hours of playing time per day with an additional hour for lunch (40 minutes) and tea (20 minutes) with a mandatory 90 overs per day, one day internationals, played over a single day (approximately 8-9 hours hours) with each side batting/bowling for 50 overs (ODI), and Twenty20 matches, usually played in the evening, with each side batting/bowling for 20 overs (T20). The fact that T20 cricket matches, unlike Test Matches and ODIs, are not demanding in terms of spectator time - with a typical T20 match being completed in 3-4 hours - and that the 20 over format encourages and promotes exciting and explosive play has done much to promote the popularity of this form of the game. 
	The formation of the Indian Premier League (IPL) in 2008 sought to unlock the commercial potential that the popularity of T20 cricket offered by modelling itself on football's English Premier League (EPL): IPL teams, like those in the EPL, would be based on geographical areas within the relevant country but would include players of various nationalities.  The IPL teams - of which there were eight in 2008 - were franchises of the IPL.  The IPL acted as a holding company, securing the participation of players through a guaranteed base price and  then selling these players to the various IPL franchises though an auction system which determined their final payment. There were thus two components to a player's "value": the base price determined by the IPL and the final price paid at the IPL auction by the winning bid for that player. 
	The basic assumption made in this paper is that the base price for a player is founded for the most part on the publicly available information about him. For example, batsman X's base price might be based on inter alia his batting average, his strike rate (runs per 100 balls), his specialist position in the batting order, the form of cricket - Test Match or ODIs - to which he was best suited.​[1]​ Of course, one cannot rule out the possibility that private information might also enter the base price equation - for example, it might be "known" for an Indian player that he was a positive (or negative) influence in the dressing room without corresponding information being available about, say, Australian players.  Nor can the role of sentiment be ruled out. Prior to the formation of the IPL, international cricket was largely based on inter-country competition. Although the IPL sought to form teams of mixed nationalities one cannot rule out bias in setting base prices: a nationalistic bias in favour of Indian players or, conversely, an excessive awe of foreign heroes.  However, given that cricket is a game replete with publicly available statistical information about all international (and national) players, we believe that in essence - the above caveats notwithstanding - base prices follow the semi-strong version of the efficient market hypothesis (Fama, 1970): the base prices of players reflect all the publicly available information about them and that these prices would change in subsequent (post-2008) IPL rounds in response to newly available public information.          
	In a rational market, both the base and final prices would be engendered by the publicly available - to both the IPL and its franchisees - information on the players; consequently, there might be expected to be a close correlation between the base prices and the final prices. However, this did not appear to be the case with the player auction under IPL 2008 characterised as it was with large and unexpected differences between the base and final prices: for example, cricketing giants such as the Australian Test captain Ricky Pointing and the legendary (albeit recently retired) spin bowler Shane Warne attracted lower final prices than players of substantially inferior pedigree. This raises the possibility that non-cricketing factors entered the bidding process and that these were driven by the “irrational exuberance” created within the newly formed franchises. 
	Shiller (2005) observes that the term "irrational exuberance" (hereafter, IE) was first used on 5 December 1996 by Alan Greenspan, chairman of the Federal Reserve Board, in an after-dinner speech to the American Enterprise Institute on "The Challenge of Central Banking in a Democratic Society". In that speech he posed the question: "but how do we know when irrational exuberance has unduly escalated asset values, which then become subject to unexpected and prolonged contractions?" Since then, the term "irrational exuberance" has come to mean a heightened sense of speculative fever.  Akerlof and Shiller (2009) in their seminal book on the role of human psychology in driving the economy draw attention to Keynes' contention that much of economic activity was driven by "animal spirits"; left to its own devices, capitalist economies would pursue excess with manias followed by panic.  In attempting to flesh out Keynes' ideas, Akerlof and Shiller (2009) emphasised five aspects which comprised animal spirits: confidence, fairness, corruption and antisocial behaviour, money illusion, and stories.
	It is the contention of the paper that the IPL auction of 2008 was characterised by irrational exuberance which led to a disjoint between auction prices and base prices. The auction itself was characterised by a great deal of razzmatazz and received considerable publicity on television and in newspapers; there was the heady combination of industrial magnates (Vijay Mallya, Mukesh Ambani), Bollywood starlets (Preity Zinta, Shilpa Shetty), and past cricketing heroes (Sunil Gavaskar, Ravi Shastri). Serving as a backdrop to the adrenalin suffused atmosphere of the auction was a sense of confidence related to the financial clout that Indian cricket commanded.  The story that underpinned this confidence was that of "India Shining" - the pride that many Indians took in their country's growing economic strength.  Given that the franchises were Indian owned - and given also that it was an IPL requirement that seven of the 11 players in any match had to be Indian - the franchises were keen to promote fairness in salaries between foreign stars (the Pontings and the Warnes) and Indian players of lesser renown (the Jadejas and the Asnodkars); competition between the franchises in the crucible of the auction meant that a few million overspent on a player did not seem to matter - money illusion prevailed over the duration of the auction; finally, as subsequent events - replete with allegations of arrogance and high-handedness and of money laundering and tax avoidance - unfolded, the stench of corruption and anti-social behaviour began to spread through the IPL.        
	Against this background, this paper has three objectives:
1.	To propose, and to implement a method, for measuring the amount of investor IE in the IPL 2008 auction and to separate exuberance as being due to a mean-enhancing and an inequality-increasing effect.
2.	To examine the mark-ups (that is, the ratio of sale to base price) for the individual players and to use inequality decomposition techniques for analysing the factors underpinning inter-player inequality in mark-ups?
3.	To propose, and to implement for measuring the value of a player to his owners and to thereby arrive at an assessment of the cost of a player per unit of performance: given a price paid for a player did his subsequent IPL performance make him a "lemon" or a "plum". 
2. Past Research on Wage Determination in Professional Sport
	There are two areas of research of direct relevance to the payment outcomes in the IPL: that relating to the determination of wages in professional sport; and that dealing with investor behaviour in sports auctions and player drafts.  Although there do not appear to be studies on the determination of wages in cricket (however, see Lenten et. al. (2010), discussed below) there are a number of studies of player payments in baseball which, to a greater degree than other team sports, places emphasis on individual performances (Scully,1974; Hill and Spellman, 1983). All these studies used a combination of individual and team performance data and sport-specific institutional settings to assign player valuations. 
	Scully (1974) attempted to value the marginal productivity  of baseball players, in terms of pitching and batting, to examine the deadweight loss of the “reserve system” that characterised contracting arrangements in baseball prior to 1975. Using a simple linear model to predict the expected wages of batters and pitchers - in which the determining variables included an observed individual output  variable (number of home runs/ strike-outs), a team performance variable (win/loss ratio), and an intercept term to reflect average wages in the industry and a stochastic error term to pick up unexplained factors - he found that under the reserve system, star players were under-rewarded to a significant degree and were subsidising average players and contributing to producer surpluses. Hill and Spellman (1983) undertook a similar exercise after the reserve system and found that now player wages were aligned more closely to individual performance.
	The other area of direct relevance to the IPL is that of bidder behaviour in sports auctions such as player drafts.  Massey and Thaler (2010) used archival data on draft-day trades, player performance and remuneration to compare the market value of draft picks with the historical value of drafted players in the National Football League (NFL)  They found that in the draft process “non-regressive predictions, over confidence, the winners curse and false consensus” all combined to produce over valuations in the upper level of the draft picks, with corresponding under-valuation of lower ranking draft picks (Massey and Thaler, 2010)    
	The NFL draft process has two aspects of direct relevance to the IPL: predicting the future and competitive bidding. In models that stress rational behaviour and market efficiency, agents are assumed to make unbiased predictions about the future and markets are assumed to aggregate individual expectations into unbiased predictions of fundamental value (Massey and Thaler, 2010). However, research in this area suggests that actual behaviour in the bidding process can deviate substantially from that suggested by such models.  Massey and Thaler (2010) tested the null hypothesis of rational expectations and market efficiency by examining whether the ratio of the market values of picks will, on average, be equal to the ratio of surplus values produced.  They could not, at the 5% level of significance, accept this hypothesis but found instead that, for lower picks, the market value declined more steeply than the surplus value of the drafted players.  This finding is accounted for by a number of factors common to the competitive bidding process in professional sports. These include over-confidence, winners curse and false consensus.  
	The role of over-confidence is a spin off from the work on representativeness by Kahneman and Tversky (1973, 2000). They argued that intuitive predictions are “insufficiently regressive” by which they mean intuitive predictions are more extreme and varied than is supported by the available evidence. Similarly, over-confidence reinforces these intuitive failings whereby bidders often believe that their knowledge is more precise that is actually the case.  Alpert and Raffia (1982) conducted a trial where subjects were asked to define 90% confidence limits. They found that the subjects gave responses that were too narrow (overconfident) 43% of the time in comparison to the expected 10%.  Slovic and Corrigan (1973) found that individuals gained confidence in their predictions as their level of information increased, even if their prediction accuracy remained unchanged. This is not dissimilar to the problem faced by bidders in the IPL auction of accumulating increasing amounts of, often contradictory, information of the performance of players as the bidding process approached.​[2]​ 
	It is also well known that in a situation where bidders are competing for an item with a commonly agreed but uncertain value range, the winner commonly suffers the “winner's curse” of overpaying. The winner's curse first surfaced in the literature on competitive bidding for oil-leases (Capen et. al., 1971) and has been identified in a number of studies and within a number of competitive bidding environments (Dessauer, 1981 and Roll, 1986).   Harrison and March (1986) point to the similar concept they identify as “expectation inflation” whereby in an uncertain situation, winners of a bidding competition often come to regret their choice. Thaler (1988) argued that winner's curse can occur even if bidders have “unbiased but noisy estimates” of the players true worth because “the winning bidder is very likely to be someone who has over-estimated the actual value of the player” (Thaler, 1988, p.10).  Harrison and Bazerman (1995) point out that non-regressive predictions, the winner's curse and expectation inflation have a common root in bidder uncertainty which increases as the number of choice options increases. This is exactly the situation faced by bidding franchises in the IPL entering a new competition with limited information on the ability of individual players to adapt to this new form of the game.
	Since 2008 there have been studies on player payments in the IPL focusing, in the main, on identifying those factors that determined the final prices paid for each player. Lenten et. al. (2010) used a series of cross section regression models to determine the final valuation of players in the IPL in which the regressor variables were a combination of personal characteristic and playing ability factors, applied to Test Match and ODI performances respectively.  While the models exhibited some explanatory success they were, in the main, unable to successfully fully explain final prices by reference to past performances. As well, the models exhibited serial correlation among the variables. 
	Although serial correlation is normally regarded as a sign of model misspecification, Lenten et. al. (2010) argued that it was more likely the result of "bidder irrationality" and cited as evidence of this their finding of underbidding at the bottom, and overbidding at the top, of the final prices range. The extensive regression analysis undertaken by Lenten et al (2010) probably exhausts the useful information on the bidding process that may be gained by regression analysis using player performance data. In addition, regression analysis is hampered by the difficulty in specifying robust models for each the three playing skills: batting, bowling and fielding. As an alternative to the regression method, this paper uses a different methodology to analyse the IPL auction process by focusing on inter-player inequality in payment outcomes. 


3. Investor Exuberance in the IPL 2008 Auction 
	Structurally, the IPL consisted of eight franchises whose centres of gravity were some of India's largest urban conurbations. These were; Bangalore Royal Challengers, Chennai Super kings, Deccan Chargers, Delhi Daredevils, Kings XI Punjab, Kolkata Knight Riders, Mumbai Indians and Rajasthan Royals.  In January 2008, an auction was held for ownership of these franchises, with a base (reserve) price for securing a franchise set at $50 Million (US). The realised prices ranged from $67 million to $112 million. Media rights were sold for over 1bn.  Each of the franchises acquired players through a modified auction system the salient points of which were:
1.	Each franchise required a squad of players with 11 players playing at any one time, of which only four could be non-Indian​[3]​.
2.	The franchises bid on the basis of the salary they were prepared to offer the players.
3.	There was an overall salary cap of $5m, with a minimum requirement of $3.3m.
4.	Salaries were to be proportionately reduced if a player was unavailable for the entire six-week IPL season. If a player is unavailable for less than 25% of the season the franchise was still liable for 25% of the salary, which also counted towards the salary cap. 
5.	The salary offer would run for three years, with some flexibility for player transfer.
6.	Each bid would start with a base (reserve price) and no upper limit would be fixed, except for the overall constraint of the salary cap.
7.	Players were to be grouped into different bands within the auction based on their similar experience and ability
8.	Each franchise would nominate an iconic player who would then attract a 15% wage differential over the next highest player. Captaincy would also attract a wage loading.
	Table 1 shows the outcomes for the IPL auction of 2008 in which a total of 75 players from eight countries, contracted to the IPL, were sold to the eight franchises.  The average reserve and sale prices for the 75 players in their entirety were, respectively, $203,400 and $488,067 implying a mark-up of 2.4 of the sale price over reserve price.  By player type, the mark-up was lowest for wicketkeepers (an average of 1.87 for the 10 wicketkeepers) and was highest for all-rounders (an average of 3.07 for the 21 all-rounders); the 24 batsmen and the 20 bowlers obtained, respectively, mark-ups of 2.07 and 2.0. The mark-up was considerably higher for the 25 Indian players (3.07) than for the 50 overseas players (2.02); for the overseas players, the mark-up was highest for South Africans (2.35) and – ignoring the lone player from Zimbabwe who fetched his reserve price – was lowest for the Pakistanis (1.06).​[4]​
	Furthermore, inter-player inequality in base prices was considerably less than inter-player inequality in final prices. The values of the Gini coefficient were 0.186 and 0.321 for the distribution over the 75 players of, respectively, base and final prices.  The Gini value of 0.186 implies that the difference in reserve price between two players chosen at random would be 37.2 percent of the average:  since =203,400, this difference would be $75,664. However, the Gini value of 0.321 implies that the difference in sale price between two players chosen at random would be 64.2 percent of the average and since =488,067, this difference would be $313,339.​[5]​ 
	The above results were the consequence of two effects operating simultaneously.  The first was a mean-enhancing effect whereby the average price rose from its reserve value of $203,400 to its sale value of $488,067; the second was an inequality-increasing effect whereby, in the movement from reserve prices to sale prices, the distribution of rewards became more unequal.  If there was no change in inequality between the reserve price and sale price distributions (that is, the Gini value of 0.186 remained unchanged), the average difference in sale price between two players chosen at random would have been $181,561.​[6]​ So, the difference of $105,897 between the average difference in sale and reserve prices (respectively, $181,561 and $75,664) between two players chosen at random, inequality unchanged, represents the mean-enhancing effect. Similarly, the difference of $131,778 between the average difference in sale price between two players chosen at random, inequality (first) changed and (then) unchanged – respectively, $313,339 and $181,561 – represents the inequality-increasing effect. So, of the total difference of $313,339 in the sale price of two players chosen as random: $105, 897 was due to mean-enhancement, $181,561 was due to inequality enhancement, and the residual of $25,881 was the result of mean-inequality interaction.
	In finance, the Efficient Markets Hypothesis (EMH) asserts that financial markets are “informationlly efficient” in that prices of traded assets reflect all known information relevant to the performance of those assets: consequently, it is impossible to outperform the market except by using information unavailable to the market or through “luck”.  We assume in this paper that the reserve price for each player, as established by the IPL, is “informationally efficient” in the sense that it encapsulates all known and relevant information about the player in question.​[7]​  We assume also that the owners of the eight franchises were unlikely to have, on any systematic basis, information about the players which was not in the public domain.  Consequently, any departure of the sale price from the reserve price is attributed in this paper to investor exuberance.  As we have argued, this exuberance can take one (or, more typically, both) of two forms: mean-enhancing exuberance and/or inequality-increasing exuberance.
	We may formalise these ideas as follows. Let represent average sale and reserve prices,, and let  represent the values of the Gini coefficients associated with the distribution of sale and reserve prices.  If  represents the mark-up of average sale price over average reserve price and represents the mark-up of inequality in sale prices over inequality in reserve prices, we may define the degree of investor exuberance as:
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   If and, E=1 and there is no investor exuberance.  Investor exuberance increases as the mean mark-up () and the inequality mark-up () increase.  Since, on the available data, =2.4 and =1.73, E=4.15: consequently, investor exuberance in the IPL auction of 2008 was more than four times its “base value”. As equation (1) implies, investor exuberance is additively decomposable in logarithmic form since .Using this property, 61 percent of investor exuberance in the IPL 2008 auction was generated by mean-enhancing and the remainder, 39 percent, was generated by inequality-increasing.
	However, the above calculations must be tempered by the fact that the Gini coefficient shows a significant downward small sample bias when income is generated by one of three distributions: uniform, log-normal, and exponential (Deltas, 2003).  However, Deltas (2003) shows that the downward bias is quite small when the sample size is 50. When n=50, the raw and adjusted Gini values are 0.329 and 0.336 for the uniform distribution, 0.270 and 0.276 for the log normal distribution, and 0.490 and 0.500 for the exponential. Even assuming that the prices of the IPL players were generated by one these distributions, the sample size of 75 players makes it more than likely that the downward bias will be very small.
	 An interesting question is why, if the reserve prices incorporated all relevant information about the players, there should have been such a large degree of investor exuberance associated with the IPL auction?  To explain this one has to appeal to the literature on behavioural finance which emphasises the psychological underpinnings of financial transactions. As Krugman (2009) observed, “Practitioners of this approach emphasise two things. First, many real-world investors bear little resemblance to the cool calculators of efficient-market theory: they’re all too subject to herd behaviour, to bouts of irrational exuberance and unwarranted panic. Second, even those who try to base their decisions on cool calculation often find that they can’t, that problems of trust, credibility and limited collateral force them to run with the herd.” Under this paradigm, investors may display “overconfidence”, wish to “gamble and speculate”, perceive history as “irrelevant”, and “posture and pose” by making extravagantly expensive purchases.  
4. Inequality Analysis of the IPL 2008 Auction
	The mark-up figure of 2.4, of the average sale over average reserve price, varied considerably between players: for Manoj Tiwai (Delhi), Ishant Sharma (Kolkata), and David Hussey (Kolkata) the sale price was over six times the reserve price; at the other extreme, 19 of the 75 auctioned players were sold at their reserve price.  The behaviour of the mark-up values encapsulates investor exuberance: an average value of the mark-up greater than unity raises the sale price above reserve levels and the fact that the mark-up is different for different players makes the distribution of sale prices different from that of reserve prices. Since the Gini value of the distribution of the mark-up over the 75 players was 0.325 the inequality in its distribution was considerable: the difference in mark-ups between two players chosen at random will be 65 percent of the average: since average mark-up was 2.4, this difference would be 1.56.
	  Let  represent the mark-up for player i (i=1,…, N), with  representing the average mark-up.  Suppose, for an inequality index I (say, the Gini coefficient), I () is the inequality associated with the distribution. A natural question that arises from the inequality in the distribution of mark-ups is the following: if the players were divided into mutually exclusive groups, then how much of the observed inequality in mark-ups was due to inequality within the groups and how much was due to inequality between the groups.  For example, if the two groups were Indian and Overseas players, then part of the overall inequality in mark-ups was due to inequality within the ranks of Indian and of Overseas players and part was due to inequality between the groups of Indian and Overseas players, with Indian players obtaining, on average, a higher mark-up than Overseas players.  Similarly, if four groups were distinguished by player type – batsmen, bowlers, wicket-keepers, all-rounders - then part of the overall inequality in mark-ups was due to inequality within the batsmen, bowlers, wicket-keepers, and all-rounders and part was due to inequality between the different player types with some types obtaining, on average, a higher mark-up than other types.
	In this section we attempt to answer this question using the methodology of inequality decomposition.  The property of decomposability implies that there should be coherent relationship between inequality in a group and inequality in its subgroups (Cowell, 1977): the basic idea is that total inequality (say, among the salaries of all the IPL players) should be capable of being written as a function of inequality within and between player subgroups (say, Indian and Overseas players).  A particularly attractive form of decomposability is additive decomposability when total inequality can be expressed as the sum of within and between subgroup inequalities.   
	More formally, suppose that the N players in the auction are divided into M mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive groups with Nm (m=1…M) players in each group.  Let  and  represent the vector of mark-ups among, respectively, all the players (i=1…N) and the players in group m.  Then an inequality index  defined over the vector of mark-ups is said to be additively decomposable if:
	                           (2)
where:  represents the overall level of inequality;   represents the level of inequality within group m; A – expressed as the weighted sum of the inequality in each group, wm being the weights – and B represent, respectively, the within-group and the between-group contribution to overall inequality.
	Many inequality measures (Gini, logarithmic variance, the variance of logarithms, relative mean deviation) are not decomposable and only inequality indices which belong to the family of Generalised Entropy Indices are additively decomposable (Shorrocks, 1980).  These indices are defined by a parameter   and, when =0, the weights are the population shares of the different groups (that is,); since the weights sum to unity, the within-group contribution A of equation (4) is a weighted average of the inequality levels within the groups. Furthermore, when =0, the inequality index takes the form:​[8]​ 
	                   (3)
	The inequality index defined in equation (3) is known as the Theil’s (1967) Mean Logarithmic Deviation (MLD) and, because of its attractive features in terms of the interpretation of the weights, it  was the one used in this study  to decompose players’ mark-ups.
	Although inequality within a given group or subgroup is a purely ordinal concept, the decomposition by component subgroups is contingent upon the specific cardinalisation of the inequality measure.  Cowell and Jenkins (1995) show that there are two approaches to the cardinalisation issue: one based on statistically convenient considerations and the other based on  explicitly additively separable social welfare. Cardinalisation based on the former property (G-cardinalisation) results in the Generalised Entropy family of indices of which the MLD index of equation (3) is a specific case.   Under both G- and A-cardinalisations, Cowell and Jenkins (1995) have argued, the proportionate contribution of the between-group component (B) to overall inequality is the inequality literature’s analogue of the R2 statistic used in regression analysis: the size of this contribution is a measure of the amount of inequality that can be ‘explained’ by the factor (or factors) used to subdivide the sample (for example, by type of player).     
	When the division of players was by whether they were Overseas or Indian players,  17 percent of overall inequality in the distribution of mark-ups between the 75 players auctioned was explained by inequality between the groups (the term B in equation (2), above): in other words, the fact that the average mark-ups for Indian and Overseas players were, respectively, 3.43 and 2.07 was sufficient to explain 17 percent of overall inequality; the remaining 83 percent was due to mark-up inequality within the ranks of Indian and Overseas players.  Similarly, when the division of players was by country, 23 percent of overall inequality in the distribution of mark-ups between the 75 players auctioned was explained by inequality between the groups. 
	In contrast, when the division was by player type – batsman, bowler, wicketkeeper, all-rounder - 5 percent of overall inequality in the distribution of mark-ups between the 75 players auctioned was explained by inequality between the groups; when the division of players was by the team to which they belonged - Bangalore, Chennai, Delhi, Hyderabad, Kolkata, Jaipur, Mohali, and Mumbai – less than 2 percent of overall inequality in the distribution of mark-ups between the 75 players auctioned was explained by inequality between the groups (the term B in equation (2), above): as Table 2 shows, there was not a great deal of difference in the mark-ups associated with the different teams.
	From this analysis we conclude that nearly one quarter of the observed inequality between the players in their mark-ups over their reserve prices was explained by their country; in contrast, very little of such inequality between the players was explained by the franchise team which bought their services.    
5.  Value for Money: the Market for Lemons or Plums	
	The amounts of money that the eight franchises paid for the different players raise the very natural question: what did the franchisees get for their money? Did they buy a “lemon” that cost a lot and performed poorly? Or did they acquire a “plum” that performed well and didn’t cost very much? These are the questions addressed in this section.
	The problem with comparing performances across players is that different types of players contribute in different ways: batsmen score runs, bowlers take wickets, and everyone is supposed to field. So, how does one compare the performance of a bowler who, over the season, scored a few runs, took a number of wickets, held a few catches with that of a batsman who scored many more runs, probably didn’t take any wickets, and also held a few catches?  Furthermore, how does one factor in the performance of the captain who, in addition to batting/bowling/fielding, has to organise the team’s strategy and tactics. Lastly, some players, on some occasions, made match-winning contributions and this, too, should be factored into their performance.
	We begin by adopting the analogy of the market. Different suppliers bring different quantities of their products to the market so that, say, 1000 kilograms of potatoes are competing with 300 kilograms of apples and 100 kilograms of sausages. The relative supply of these products then establishes the exchange rate between them: 1 kilogram of sausages exchanges for 10 kilograms of potatoes and 3 kilograms of apples. Over the course of the 2008 IPL tournament, the 77 players (auctioned and iconic) collectively scored a total of 11,227 runs, took 322 wickets and took 496 catches and stumpings. Consequently, adopting the above food market analogy, the exchange rate between these activities was that 1 wicket taken was equivalent to 35 runs being scored and to 1.54 catches/stumpings being taken. So, if represent the runs scored, the wickets taken, and the catches affected by player i (i = 1.. N) in the course of the tournament, we define the performance of the player (measured in “performance units”) as:
		(4)
where: =(1/35)=0.03; =1; and =(1/1.54)=0.65.  For players who won the "man of the match" award, we enhanced the performance, Zi, of the players by 5 percent for each time they won this award. So, if Mi represents the number of times player i won the man of the match award, Zi = Zi + 0.05Zi  Mi.  Lastly, the performance of players who also captained their side was enhanced by 10 percent.
	Table 3 shows the performances over the 1PL 2008 tournament of the auctioned plus iconic players who played in the entire tournament.  The two best performing players were Shane Warne (captain, 70 runs, 19 wickets, 12 catches) with a performance level of 31.6 and Adam Gilchrist (two man of the match awards, 436 runs and 25 catches and sumpings).  The top 10 performers – the plums - were: Warne, Gilchrist, Chawla, Pathan (Y), Ganguly, Dhoni, Raina, Pathan (I), Morkel, and Singh (RP).  The 10 worst performers – the lemons - were:  Taibu, Zoysa, Silva, Katich, Tiwari, White, Jaffer, Vaas, Laxman, and Malinga.
	However, in terms of the unit cost of performance – defined as the ratio of sale price to performance level - the 10 players providing the best value for money – the plums - were: Gul, Maharoof, Fernando, Warne, Chawla, Patel (M), Smith (G), Akmal, Pathan (Y), and Sharma (J). At the other end of the scale, the 10 players providing least value for money were: Tiwari, Sharma (I), Singh (H), Taibu, Tendulkar, Oram, Kaif, Kallis, Kartik (M), and Laxman.
	In order to assess the cricketing and financial acumen of the different teams in buying players we begin by considering the case of the Kolkata Franchise. As Table 4 shows, this franchise bought six players who committed to play for the entire season of whom one was a wicket keeper (Taibu), two were bowlers (Sharma (I) and Kartik (M)), two were batsmen (Ganguly and Hussey (D)), and one was an all-rounder (Agarkar).  The performance of this squad, as measured in performance units, over the 2008 IPL season was 69.5 and when combined with the $3,567,500 that the franchise spent on these six players yielded an average cost of $51,330 per unit of performance (Table 5). 
	In retrospect, this was clearly not the best use of its money. Instead of Agarkar ($350,000 for a performance of 10.2) it could have bought Yusuf Pathan ($475,000 for a performance of 27.3); instead of Ishant Sharma ($950,000 for a performance of 9.3) and Murali Kartik ($425,000 for a performance of 7.1), it could have bought Piyush Chawla ($400,000 for a performance of 27.4) and Sreesanth ($625,000 for a performance of 21.3); instead of David Hussey ($625,000 for a performance of 15.8) it could have bought Suresh Raina ($650,000 for a performance of 25.3); instead of Taibu ($125,000 for a performance of 1.5), it could have bought Parthiv Patel (($325,000 for a performance of 14.5)  If it had done so, it’s total expenditure would have remained unchanged but it’s total performance would have increased from 69.5 to 141.4 and, in consequence, it’s unit cost would have fallen by more than half from $51,330 to $25,229 per unit of performance.     	

6. Postscript and Conclusions
	The auction of January 2008 offered players a three year contract.  So, in January 2011 there was a fresh auction in which 127 players were sold to ten franchises - Kochi and Pune being the new entrants - with players setting their base price by placing themselves in one of three base price tiers: $400,000, $300,000, and $200,000. Of the 215 players who were put up for sale in 2011, but who could not find a buyer only two - Ganguly and Jaffer - were Indian, the rest being overseas players.  The highest prices were paid for Indian players: Gambhir set an IPL record with a price of $2.4 million and the average price of $735, 333 paid for the 45 Indian players sold in the auction contrasted with the average of $362,622 paid for the 82 overseas players.
	These two features reflect a growing trend towards making the IPL more "Indian".  In turn, this is based on three factors. First, there is a growing confidence among Indians that their players stand comparison with the best in the world: India is the top ranked Test playing country and a former World Cup T20 winner and the 2011 auctions followed hard on the heels of Indian victories over Australia and New Zealand at home followed by a successful tour of South Africa.  Second, there is the growing realisation that some foreign stars either do not take their commitment to their IPL teams very seriously or their commitment to their own countries' playing schedule reduces their availability to the IPL: in the 2001 auction, former stars like Chris Gayle and Brian Lara could not find an IPL home.  Third, there is the issue of security: having expensive overseas stars in the side increases the need for greater security and protection.  The security consideration has particularly affected Pakistani players: first, there is the problem of securing visas for Pakistani players which becomes particularly acute in a period of Indo-Pakistan tension; second, right-wing Hindu political parties would prefer to see Pakistani players excluded from the IPL.​[9]​ As a consequence, after an initial presence in the 2008 IPL - when, perhaps, for reasons of chauvinism they attracted low prices - Pakistani players have subsequently failed to attract buyers. 
	The results of the 2011 IPL auction suggest that irrational exuberance has not gone away; it has merely been turned towards Indian players.  A more pressing question for the teams is how to ensure, and sustain, attendance for its matches. In large part this needs a large and loyal fan base based on team performance and the continued presence of iconic players with whom fans can identify. Bairam et. al. (1990) address the question of the type of player that would maximise the chances of winning first-class matches: for Australia, with its four-day matches, the best combination is attacking batsmen and defensive bowlers and that was also true for the now defunct (40-overs a side) John Player League games in England (Schofield, 1983, 1988).  The same is likely to be the case in T20 cricket where it is as important for the bowler to bowl "dot balls" as "wicket-taking" balls.​[10]​
	The retention of iconic players whom fans identify with the team - witness the fans' wrath when Wayne Rooney recently threatened to move from Manchester United to Manchester City - is another important factor influencing attendance.  In this, Delhi Daredevils surely missed a trick when, by releasing Gambhir, a local player, it dismantled the most destructive and exciting opening combination of Sehwag and Gambhir. However, all said and done, in one respect, the IPL contrasts strongly with football's English Premier League: in the latter, it is often said that foreign stars prevent home-grown players from blooming; in the IPL, it is home-grown talent which occupies centre-stage and keeps foreign stars in the wings waiting for buyers.
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Table 2: Indian Premier League 2008 Auction: Reserve and Sale Prices, by category


































Table 3: IPL 2008, Performance of Auctioned Players who Played in Entire Tournament








































































































































Table 5: Cost of Player Performance by Team: IPL 2008*

















^1	  Anecdotal evidence would suggest that the IPL employed advisers to establish base prices of players. We assume that such advisers - the IPL Board had three past Indian players, Gavaskar, Pataudi, and Shastri, as members - used the publicly available information in advising on the appropriate base prices.
^2	  There was also an issue as to what player performance data was relevant to the specific conditions of the IPL given that data were mostly available across the two areas of cricket (Test Matches and ODIs).
^3	  This allowed some flexibility in the make-up of the squads, in particular allowing some players who were unavailable for the full period to contract for only part of the tournament. In general , however, players were contracted for more than one year
^4	  The null hypothesis that the mean of the base and sale prices were equal could not be accepted on a t-test with a t(75)=5.35. However, the null hypothesis that the variance of the base and sale prices were equal could not be rejected on a F-test with F(74,79)=1.14.
^5	  If pi is the price (reserve or sale) of the ith player (i=1,..,N), and  represents the average price, the Gini coefficient is defined as: .  In other words, the Gini coefficient is computed as half the mean of the difference in the prices between pairs of workers, divided by the average price (). Values close to 1 reveal high inequality while those close to 0 indicate low inequality. 
^6	  37.2 per cent of $488,067.
^7	  See Lenten et. al. (2010) for a list of such possible variables
^8	  The general form of this index is:  
^9	  The Shiv Sena chief, Bal Thackeray said that Bollywood superstar Shah Rukh Khan, the owner of Kolkata Knight Riders - deserved Pakistan's highest civilian award, the Nishaan-E-Pakistan, for supporting the inclusion of Pakistani cricketers in the IPL (The Hindustan Times, 30 January 2010) and went on to brand him a traitor (http://www.nation.com.pk/pakistan-news-newspaper-daily-english-online/International/06-Feb-2010/Shah-Rukh-Khan-a-traitor-Bal-Thackeray).
^10	  See also Bhattacharya and Smyth (2003) and Paton and Cooke (2005).
